Rapid Support Forces (RSF) & Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”)
Who they are
- The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are a powerful paramilitary force in Sudan, originally formed from the Janjaweed militias of Darfur and formally established in 2013-14 under the leadership of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (commonly called “Hemedti”).
- In recent years the RSF has grown both militarily (with heavy weapons, drones, etc) and politically, gaining control of large swathes of Sudan, especially in Darfur and other western regions.
- RSF forces recently seized the city of El Fasher (the capital of North Darfur) after a prolonged siege of about 500 days. Reports indicate widespread atrocities after capture — including executions, rape, and forced displacement of civilians. (wolver9.rssing.com)
- Analysts characterise Hemedti and the RSF as a “ruthless warlord” outfit: one which is not just fighting an insurgency, but effectively positioning itself as a de-factor governing force in parts of Sudan. As one commentary puts it: “the bloodthirsty warlord taking control of a state — and how the UK will respond to him.” (Royal United Services Institute)
What’s happening & why it matters
- The RSF’s seizure of El Fasher, and their broader expansion, marks a shift: from being a militia to being a power broker with ambitions of state-control. The humanitarian cost is enormous: UN officials say that women and girls are being raped, civilians executed, and thousands forced to flee. (wolver9.rssing.com)
- This matters globally because once such a group consolidates territorial control and acts like a governing body, it presents multiple risks:
- Humanitarian & atrocity risk: large-scale violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
- Regional instability: uncontrolled flows of refugees, arms, gold/smuggling, destabilisation of neighbouring states.
- Governance vacuum: When non-state armed actors become de facto governors, legitimacy, law, and diplomatic norms are challenged.
- International complicity/guilt-by–association: External states (like the UAE) are accused of supporting the RSF, which complicates diplomacy. (Reddit)
The UK’s stance & how it’s expected to respond
According to analysis by Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and UK official statements:
- The UK government maintains that neither the RSF nor the conventional Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) should play a legitimate role in Sudan’s future governance, given the atrocities committed. (Reddit)
- The UK is focusing on humanitarian support, diplomatic alignment (via African Union, UN, etc), and leveraging multilateral channels rather than direct engagement with RSF. For instance, the UK hosted a conference on Sudan that emphasised civilian-led transition, rejecting parallel governments and external interference. (Hansard)
- Engagement pragmatism: In practical terms, since the UK recognizes that RSF control might be a reality on the ground, it may support recovery and humanitarian work even if formal engagement is limited or problematic. One insider noted:
“…the UK would continue to support the country’s recovery irrespective of its leader, as it recognises states rather than individuals.” (Reddit)
- Sanctions/arms-controls: The UK (with partners) will monitor arms flows, external support to the RSF, and may impose or coordinate sanctions on actors who enable atrocities (including foreign backers). RUSI commentary emphasises the UK still has “levers that clearly have not been pulled.” (Royal United Services Institute)
Case Study: RSF’s takeover of El Fasher
- The RSF overran El Fasher after months of siege, which was the last major SAF stronghold in North Darfur. (wolver9.rssing.com)
- After capture, credible reports emerged of:
- House-to-house raids, executions of civilians fleeing.
- Mass displacement of tens of thousands.
- Breakdown in humanitarian access and protection.
- The takeover solidified the RSF’s hold over Darfur region, enabling it to assert governance functions and control resource flows (minerals, gold, etc).
- Implication: What began as militia action has morphed into territorial governance by force, which creates a new paradigm for international response.
Commentators’ views
- Michael Jones (Senior Research Fellow at RUSI) asserts:
“These accusations against Abu Dhabi of supporting a group responsible for massacres, war crimes, ethnic-cleansing, they’re not new… If they were going to change purely on the basis of public and diplomatic opinion, one would have thought that shift would already have taken place.” (Reddit)
- On UK policy dilemmas:
“There would be tensions over any engagement with the RSF given the ‘toxicity of the brand domestically and internationally’.” (Reddit)
- On worst-case scenario:
“For a UK context … of championing atrocity-prevention … it’s a very unpalatable political proposition of engaging in those conversations.” (Reddit)
What to watch
- Whether the RSF consolidates more formal governance roles, e.g., declaring alternate government structures, entering diplomatic relations, controlling revenue streams (gold/mining).
- How external states (UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) continue to interact with RSF — the UK’s ability to influence or sanction those flows matters.
- UK’s humanitarian/diplomatic steps: Will the UK increase humanitarian aid, freeze or redirect resources, impose arms embargoes, join multilateral efforts led by African Union?
- Whether UK (and allies) formally recognise or refuse to recognise any RSF-led governance structure—this influences international law legitimacy and aid flows.
- The balance between principle (i.e., no dealing with war-criminal organisations) and pragmatism (i.e., stabilising the region, protecting civilians) in UK foreign policy.
- Here are detailed case studies and comments concerning the rise of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) in Sudan — and how the UK is positioned to respond.
Case Study 1: RSF territorial take-over in Darfur and beyond
What happened
- According to a January 2025 UK government country-policy note, the RSF “had secured control of four of five Darfur states, including strategic cities, supply routes and border areas” by December 2023. (GOV.UK)
- In late October 2025 the RSF reportedly captured the city of El Fashir, the last major military stronghold in North Darfur, marking a possible consolidation of control over Darfur. (The Washington Post)
- The RSF methods have included looting, attacks on hospitals and civilians, and destruction of infrastructure. For example: the RSF attacked a village in North Kordofan, burning homes and the only health-centre there. (AP News)
- Analysts describe the RSF as following the “militia-capture-state” model: militarily seizing territory, co-opting state functions, exploiting business-networks and resource flows. (The African Mirror – For Africa – Always)
Why it matters
- The RSF’s control over large areas means they are acting less like a rebellious force and more like a de-facto governing actor, which challenges the traditional assumption of a state monopolising force.
- This shift has profound implications for humanitarian access, accountability (war crimes, crimes against humanity), regional stability (mass displacement), and external engagement.
- For the UK (and other states) the question becomes: how to deal with a non-state actor that is acting like a state but lacks legitimacy, and which is accused of atrocities.
Case Study 2: RSF creates a “parallel government”
What happened
- In February 2025 the RSF and allied armed/political groups signed a charter to establish a “government of peace and unity”. (Reuters)
- This indicates RSF’s ambition not just to fight for power but to formalise governance structures — a hallmark of “state capture” by non-state forces.
- The move has been condemned by the legitimate federal government and is unlikely to be broadly recognised internationally. (Reuters)
Why it matters
- The creation of a parallel government underscores the fragmentation of state sovereignty in Sudan.
- For external actors like the UK, this complicates diplomacy: do you recognise or engage with this body? What are the implications for sanctioning, aid delivery, peace-process involvement?
- It heightens the risks of a “de facto partition” of the country — if the RSF controls territory and resources and sets up governance, the future may look like multiple rival power centres.
UK-oriented Comments & Positioning
- The UK has formally recognised that atrocities are being committed in Sudan: the UK government briefing notes that there is “a growing body of evidence of serious atrocities being committed against civilians in Sudan: the escalation of violence; the killing of civilians; the sexual assault of women; and the restriction of humanitarian access.” (House of Commons Library)
- On engagement, it has been reported the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) has held secret talks with the RSF to help humanitarian access. The move drew criticism from rights-groups for possibly legitimising the RSF. (The Guardian)
- External commentary emphasises that the international community (including the UK) failed to anticipate how the RSF would evolve from militia into governing force. For example, an article in Time argued that because structural incentives were ignored, the RSF effectively became predatory in capturing state functions. (TIME)
Key issues for the UK’s policy
- Legitimacy: The UK needs to decide whether to engage with the RSF as a governance actor (which has serious moral and legal implications) or to treat them only as militia and avoid recognition.
- Humanitarian access: With RSF in control of territory, the UK must grapple with the reality of humanitarian delivery: engaging them may be necessary but risks legitimisation.
- Sanctions & accountability: The UK already uses sanctions tools, but as the RSF becomes entrenched, enforcing accountability becomes harder and will require multilateral coordination. (House of Commons Library)
- Stability vs justice trade-off: The UK must balance short-term stability (getting aid, protecting civilians) with long-term principles (not empowering actors accused of war crimes).
Selected Comments & Insights
- From human rights organisations:
“I’m shocked. It feels like a terrible move. For the Sudanese, it will be experienced as a real slap in the face.” (on UK engaging RSF) (Reddit)
- From analysts:
“How militia groups capture states and ruin countries: the case of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces.” (title of article) (The African Mirror – For Africa – Always)
- On UK’s dilemma:
“The UK’s official position is that neither the RSF nor the SAF can be involved in the future governance of Sudan because of past atrocities.” (reddit summary) (Reddit)
Implications & What to Watch
- Whether the UK will recognise or refuse to recognise any RSF-linked governance structure. A formal recognition would set a precedent and may undermine UK’s stated human rights-based foreign policy.
- Whether the UK tightens arms export controls and sanctions in response to RSF’s arms sourcing and support networks.
- How the UK leverages multilateral diplomacy (via the UN, African Union etc) rather than purely bilateral contact — given the UK’s relatively limited direct leverage on the ground.
- Whether the UK uses humanitarian aid as leverage: conditional funding, robust monitoring, co-ordination with civil society and NGOs in RSF-controlled areas.
- How UK policy evolves if the RSF consolidates and effectively governs large parts of Sudan: will the UK adapt to a new reality or seek to restore a centralised civilian-led governance?