What Are UK Authorities Warning About?
The U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) — the cyber wing of GCHQ — has issued fresh warnings and alerts about ongoing cyber activity by Russian-aligned hacktivist groups that aim to disrupt services and operations of UK organisations, especially local government bodies and critical infrastructure operators. These warnings were published in mid-January 2026 as part of an escalating cyber threat landscape. (NCSC)
Types of Disruptive Activity
- Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS): Flooding networks or services with massive traffic volumes to make websites and services unavailable. (BleepingComputer)
- Service Disruptions: Targeting publicly facing systems to make them unavailable, slow them down, or interfere with operations. (governmenttechnology.co.uk)
- Tool Sharing & Coordination: Some groups host tools and guides (e.g., DDoSia) on public platforms like GitHub and organise via Telegram channels. (Industrial Cyber)
Who Are the Actors Involved?
NoName057(16)
- A pro-Russian hacktivist collective active since March 2022 and repeatedly flagged by the NCSC.
- Focuses on DDoS attacks against targets it perceives as aligned against Russian geopolitical interests — especially NATO members. (Industrial Cyber)
Other Pro-Russian Hacktivist Groups
- Broader international advisories (from US and partners) also mention additional actors such as Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), Z-Pentest, Sector16 and affiliates that have been involved in opportunistic attacks on critical infrastructure globally. (nsa.gov)
These groups are generally ideologically motivated, not financially driven, meaning they aim to achieve political disruption rather than steal data for profit. (IT Pro)
Targets and Impact
UK Focus
- Local government bodies: Websites and online services are frequent targets for DoS campaigns that slow or crash access for legitimate users. (Government Business)
- Critical infrastructure sectors: Entities tasked with essential services (utilities, transport, communications) are warned to expect and plan for disruption. (Industrial Cyber)
Why These Targets?
The groups frame their actions as retaliation for Western support to Ukraine and other foreign policy positions contrary to Russian interests. This puts UK organisations — especially those supporting NATO and allied policies — at risk. (The Standard)
UK Government & NCSC Response
The UK is not just sounding the alarm — it’s actively urging organisations to harden defences and build resilience:
Key Guidance from NCSC
- Strengthen DoS/DDoS defences: Including rate limiting, traffic scrubbing, redundant architectures, and service scalability. (governmenttechnology.co.uk)
- Understand your infrastructure: Map out what services you offer and where attacks could overwhelm resources. (Government Business)
- Adopt incident response planning: Ensure there are tested plans to maintain operations during an attack. (IT Pro)
In addition, the UK government has been developing broader national strategies — such as its Cyber Action Plan — to improve public services’ cyber security and resilience overall. (Help Net Security)
Broader Context
This UK threat isn’t isolated. Partners like the U.S. NSA and FBI have jointly warned of pro-Russia hacktivist activities targeting critical infrastructure globally, underscoring that this type of cyber pressure is part of wider geopolitical tensions playing out in cyberspace. (nsa.gov)
How Serious Is the Threat?
- These attacks tend to be lower sophistication than nation-state APT campaigns, but can still cause significant disruption and financial cost due to service outages and recovery efforts. (The Register)
- The persistence and frequency signal a sustained threat environment that organisations must plan for — especially as geopolitical tensions remain high. (The Record from Recorded Future)
Bottom Line
Russian-aligned hacktivist groups are actively intensifying disruptive cyber operations against UK organisations — mainly through denial-of-service attacks — and UK authorities are urging targeted sectors to bolster defences, enhance resilience, and prepare for continued activity. The situation reflects broader trends in cyber conflict tied to international political tensions. (Infosecurity Magazine)
Here are detailed case studies and expert comments on the recent surge of Russian-aligned hacktivist disruptive cyber activity against organisations in the United Kingdom — focusing on real incidents, impacts, and analysis from security professionals and official sources.
Case Study #1 — NoName057(16) DDoS Attacks on UK Public Websites (2025)
What happened:
A pro-Russian hacktivist group calling itself NoName057(16) publicly claimed responsibility for targeting several UK websites with distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks — a common disruptive tactic that floods online services with traffic to make them hard to reach or temporarily unavailable. These attacks were linked to the group’s stated opposition to the UK’s support for Ukraine in the conflict with Russia. (The Guardian)
Targets included:
- Local council websites (Blackburn and Darwen, Exeter)
- Public service bodies like the Association for Police and Crime Commissioners
- Harwich International Port and Cardiff city council (comments not provided by those organisations at the time) (The Guardian)
Impact:
- Some council sites reported temporary disruptions (e.g., Arun district council was unavailable for a few hours before restoration).
- Not all claimed targets experienced outages — councils like Blackburn reported normal operations.
- No evidence emerged of data compromise — the attacks focused on access disruption, not theft. (The Guardian)
Comments from authorities:
- UK organisations affected quickly restored services, and agencies like the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) provided guidance on strengthening defences.
- The NCSC noted such attacks are “relatively low in sophistication” but can still disrupt online services and affect public trust. (The Guardian)
Case Study #2 — Targeted Local Government Platforms (Manchester & Greater Manchester Councils)
In the autumn of 2024, multiple councils in Greater Manchester — including Salford, Bury, Trafford and Tameside — were reported to have been targeted with DDoS campaigns believed to be linked to the same pro-Russian hacktivist collective (NoName057(16)).
- Screenshots shared by cybersecurity enthusiasts online showed council websites temporarily unreachable due to high inbound traffic.
- Local authorities confirmed the sites were restored and multiple layers of mitigation were deployed with support from the NCSC. (Reddit)
This illustrates a recurring pattern: ideologically motivated hacktivists repeatedly select public-facing civic infrastructure precisely because outages are visible to residents and media.
Case Study #3 — Repeated Campaigns Through 2022–2025
Even before 2026, this pattern was seen in repeat waves:
- In late 2024, reports surfaced of a daily target list of UK councils being attacked, with several websites intermittently down. (The Register)
- Prior campaigns also involved groups such as the pro-Russia collectives Killnet, who have claimed DDoS responsibility against UK services in 2022 and 2023 (e.g., parliamentary and public portals), though attribution and impact varied by source and timeframe. (Reddit)
These examples show that although the attacks are not extremely advanced technically, they are persistent and repeatable, making them a continuous nuisance.
Expert & Official Commentary
NCSC (UK’s National Cyber Security Centre)
- Recent advisories repeatedly emphasise that pro-Russia hacktivist groups remain active and have been targeting UK local government and critical infrastructure operators with disruptive DoS campaigns.
- The NCSC highlighted that groups like NoName057(16) operate through public channels and tools (e.g., Telegram and DDoSia) which lowers barriers for participation.
- UK authorities insist organisations should move from basic defence to operational resilience planning — meaning systems should be designed to withstand and quickly recover from attacks, not just prevent them. (IT Pro)
Security Researcher Views
Dr Ric Derbyshire (Orange Cyberdefense):
- Described the trend as “escalatory hacktivism” — where groups combine ideological narratives with practical cyber disruption tactics.
- Warned that such campaigns could evolve from simple DDoS attacks into more consequential operations, potentially targeting operational technology environments. (Help Net Security)
Community Insights
Cybersecurity professionals and community forums highlight that while these groups are often not as technically sophisticated as state-level advanced persistent threats (APTs), their continued focus on civic services means even basic attacks can have real costs (downtime, staff hours, reputational harm, emergency service delays). (Reddit)
What These Cases Show
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Motivation | Ideological, driven by geopolitical positions (e.g., opposition to Ukraine support) |
| Tactics | Primarily DDoS/DoS flooding public service websites |
| Targets | Local councils, ports, public infrastructure services |
| Impact | Temporary outages, operational cost to recover services |
| Trend | Recurring campaigns over multiple years |
Key Takeaways
- Attackers like NoName057(16) are most visible due to self-claims on social platforms, but analysts believe their activity is part of a broader ecosystem of pro-Russia hacktivist groups that share tools and targets. (nukib.gov.cz)
- UK authorities view these campaigns as disruptive but not necessarily sophisticated cybersecurity threats at the level of espionage, yet they are still disruptive to public services and a drain on resources. (The Register)
- Experts caution that even low-complexity attacks, repeated often enough, can erode trust and impose real costs on organisations that have to respond and recover. (Reddit)